price that European producers pay for cereals The
States exports to the EC and other countries, poultry production costs, prohibits imports, maily the Middle East. Along with legal and subsidizes exports. This has contributed redress under the General Agreement on to the EC becoming the dominant poultry exTariffs and Trade (GATT), retaliatory action porter, displacing United States exports, by the United States government (as in the especially from the Middle East, the major imchicken war" of the late 1960's) has been porting region. The National Broiler Council suggested et al. provide details on changes in these The objective of this paper is to examine the market shares.
consequences of the EC policy, particularly A detailed description of the history and opfor the United States. Two approaches are eration of the CAP as it affects poultry is proused. In the first, poultry meat is treated as a vided by Alston and the National Broiler homogeneous product. An equilibrium disCouncil et al. In summary, there are two maplacement model is used to predict the effect jor elements of the CAP which affect the Eurof EC policies on the world price and hence on opean poultry industry. Variable import the volume of United States exports. In the levies and domestic price supports raise the second approach, poultry meat is treated as being differentiated by region of origin, so price as a result of export subsidies, e = the that European and United States poultry are elasticity of EC poultry supply, e = the not perfect substitutes. A more detailed equielasticity of EC poultry demand, and 1x = the librium displacement model is solved for the elasticity of export demand for poultry facing effects of the EC policies on prices and trade the EC. flows among six regional markets and to
The solution of this system yields equations analyze the effects of a retaliatory export subfor the five endogenous variables (dlnQe, sidy by the United States.
dlnDe, dlnXe, dlnPx,and dlnPe) as functions of Theoretically, the two models are identical.
(d the two Whether poultry meat from different counp intervention measures (a and ). To policy intervention measures (, and O) . To tries is regarded as homogeneous by consimulate the effects of eliminating the CAP, sumers is an empirical question. 2 The two the policy intervention measures are set at a models differ only in terms of the empirical percent (a 9 percent reduction in EC assumptions made about the elasticities of production costs due to eliminating the CAP substitution among poultry products from difgrains, as estimated by Alston) and = -13 ferent countries. The first^ model may be -percent (a 13 percent reduction in the EC thought of as a simpler limiting case of the price relative to the EC export price due to more general second model, with infinite elaseliminating export subsidies, as estimated by ticities of substitution assumed.
Alston).
The key parameters are elasticities of EC MODEL 1: POULTRY AS A supply, EC domestic demand, and export de-HOMOGENEOUS GOOD mand facing the EC. One approach to estimate these parameters would be to do original The following linear-in-logarithms equilibeconometric work, but it would be difficult, rium displacement model of the EC poultry given available data, to improve upon existing market assumes poultry is a homogeneous estimates econometrically. Previous estigood. A more detailed explanation of this mates for the EC by Thomson and Harvey model is provided by Alston. Equations (1), suggest a demand elasticity of -0.5. A similar (2), and (3) are the EC poultry supply, estimate was obtained by Alston for the domestic demand, and export demand equaUnited States (see also George and King, tions, respectively, expressed in terms of Wohlgenant and Hahn, and Harling and percentage changes and elasticities. Equation
Thompson). Based on these estimates, a (4) is a market clearing identity, and equation wholesale elasticity of demand of -0.5 is (5) is an equilibrium identity that reflects the assumed to apply in all regions. EC price wedge. All of the equations are
The supply elasticity is more difficult. One logarithmic differential approximations to could make a fairly strong prior case for a general forms so that for any variable Y, dlnY highly elastic long-run supply function for = the percentage change in Y. Equations poultry in the EC and other countries. Con-(1)-(5) may be represented as: stant returns to scale in the aggregate seems (1) dlnQe = Ee(dlnPe -a), plausible, and there are no obviously limiting (2) dlnDe = qedlnPe, specialized factors given the relative unimpor-(3) dlnXe = ,xdlnPx, tance of the poultry sector in any country. (4) dlnQe = (De/Qe)dlnDe+(Xe/Qe)dlnXe, When choosing a supply elasticity for policy and analysis, a balance must be struck between (5) dlnPx = dlnPethis type of reasoning and the econometric where Qe = EC production of poultry, Pe = evidence. Some previous studies have relied EC wholesale price of poultry, De = EC conon the econometric estimates in the literature. sumption of poultry, Xe = EC poultry exports, For instance, Thomson and Harvey used an PX = EC poultry export price (net of subsidy), EC poultry supply elasticity of 1.0, but given ca = the percentage shift up of the EC poultry the arguments above, this seems low as an supply function (increase in marginal costs) estimate of a long-run supply elasticity. due to the CAP grains, ( = the percentage Harling and Thompson used even lower change in the EC domestic relative to export elasticities of supply for the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany, 0.2 to EC exports would reduce the "world price" 0.5. by 2 percent, and that is probably an exagChavas and Johnson developed a detailed geration of EC market power. model of poultry supply response in the Results of eliminating the CAP policies afUnited States which explicitly incorporates fecting poultry (both the export subsidies and the dynamics of response. We regard that the effects of grains policies on poultry feed model as the best specification in the costs) are shown in estimates of the fall in EC production and exare used, reflecting the authors' belief that ports. However, only in the cases when a low even the best off the available econometric supply elasticity (2 or 1) is used in conjunction estimates of the supply elasticity (Chavas and with an export demand elasticity as low as Johnson's) may be too small. Results are ob--50 would the EC continue to export poultry tained using a supply elasticity of 1.0 as well, in the absence of the CAP, and, even in these to indicate the effects of using a smaller supcases, exports would be negligible. ply elasticity. wholesale (-0.5 by assumption), Er = ROW wholesale (-0.5 by assumption), r = ROW a Based on a = -9; : = -13; Be = -0.5; and an export share of 10% for the EC.
elasticity of supply, and Eer = an overall
In cases where exports fall by more than 100 percent, the EC would become a net -elasticity of EC price transmission to the importer.
ROW-a weighted average of individual While the effects on the EC price and EC elasticities of EC price transmission to other consumption of poultry fall within a very narcountries.
row range, the effects on production, exports, Assuming perfect price transmission (Eer = and the export price are sensitive to the sup-1) and using an ROW demand elasticity of ply elasticity and export demand elasticity. As -0.5, an ROW supply elasticity of 5, and the would be expected, the effect on EC produc-1981 quantity data (Table 3 ) yields a value for tion is relatively sensitive to the supply %x of -301. However, values of -50 and -250 elasticity, and the effects on exports and the are used reflecting the existence of trade barexport price are relatively sensitive to the exriers that result in an elasticity of price transport demand elasticity. The use of a smaller mission of less than 1 and the possibility of a (in magnitude) elasticity of either supply or lower ROW supply elasticity. To someone not export demand results in smaller effects on accustomed to dealing with a model of internaquantities produced and exported. However, tional trade in which only small fractions are a larger supply elasticity implies a greater eftraded, even these scaled down elasticities feet on the export price, while a larger magmight seem uncomfortably large. However, nitude of export demand elasticity implies a an elasticity of -50 implies that a doubling of smaller effect on the export price.
The authors favor the use of a supply elasEliminating the CAP would reduce United ticity of 2 or 5. It is noted that, everything else States consumption (0.5 to 1 percent) but constant, this results in larger estimates of would increase production (1 to 10 percent) the effects of eliminating the CAP on producand exports (27 to 200 percent). The annual tion, exports, and the export price of poultry loss in United States consumer surplus due to in the EC than would be obtained using a eliminating the CAP ($79 million to $160 smaller supply elasticity. million) is always less than the gain in proThe existing policies clearly imply a major ducer surplus ($85 million to $178 million) so transfer from EC consumers to EC producers.
that there is a positive net social surplus gain The loss in consumer surplus exceeds 10 per-($6 million to $18 million) to the United States cent of the value of consumption at wholesale.
from eliminating the CAP in poultry. However, the CAP affects not only production In summary, in the absence of the CAP, the and income distribution in the EC. Also, EC would likely be a poultry importer rather through its trade effects, it has consequences than having become the world's major exportfor other countries. The net effect of the EC ing region. The export subsidies overcompenpolicy may be treated as a shift down in the sate EC producers for the higher cost of grain export supply schedule, so that when the eximposed by the CAP, and an implicit tax is port demand facing the EC is less than perborne by EC consumers. There is a significant fectly elastic, the "world price" will be cost borne by United States producers, but depressed. Applying equal weights to confrom an aggregate viewpoint, this is largely sumers and producers, net importing regions offset by the gain to United States consumers. (Japan, the Caribbean, and the Middle East) will benefit while net exporting regions MODEL 2: A DIFFERENTIATED (mainly the United States and Brazil) will be GOODS MODEL worse off.
In the preceding section, all poultry meat The EC policy causes a shift of the effective was assumed to be homogeneous, though that export demand facing the United States, such assumption may be hedged somewhat through that the price (P,), production (Q,), and exthe use of price transmission elasticities of ports (Xu) are lower, while domestic consumpless than 1. Industry sources suggest that tion in the United States -(C,) is greater. chicken meat (the major category of poultry Based on Table 1 , a decline in the United meat) from the EC is significantly different States export price of either 1 or 2 percent is from United States chicken meat. The EC examined. In 1981, total United States probirds are smaller and the fp; is whiter (Naduction and consumption of poultry meat were tional Broiler Council et al. ad Mageira) . The valued at $7.96 billion and $8.46 billion respecMiddle East market is reported to prefer the tively, using a wholesale price of $1.20/kg. The European export style chickens and has export share was 5.5 percent. Estimates of special requirements for slaughter methods United States price, quantity, and welfare efand packaging. The French seem to have fects from eliminating the CAP, using these adapted particularly well to these requirefigures, are reported in Table 2. ments; they may even have contributed to developing the Middle East preferences. The model is closed by a set of market clearing Brazilians are reported to produce both types identities that involve policy variables. The of chicken for different markets, and that system is solved for endogenous percentage might help explain their success in displacing changes in prices, production, consumption, EC poultry from the Middle East markets.
and world trade flows as functions of exThese considerations would suggest that ogenous policies to measure the effects of poultry meat is differentiated, at least in some policy changes. places, according to country of origin. This
The three basic assumptions underlying this suggestion is supported by the coexistence of model are: (1) the marginal rate of substitution imports and exports in many countries. Thus, between any two kinds of poultry meat (e.g., poultry meat from the United States may not European and Brazilian) is independent of be a perfect substitute for EC poultry. As a consumption of any other good, (2) the elasticonsequence, the effects of EC policy in the city of substitution between any two kinds of United States poultry market will be smaller poultry meat in a given market is a constant, than suggested previously. This section conand (3) the elasticity of substitution between tains a differentiated goods model of world any two kinds of poultry meat in a given trade in poultry meat which is used to assess market equals the elasticity of substitution bethe effects of eliminating the CAP. This model tween any other two kinds of poultry meat in takes explicit account of the imperfect subthe same market. stitution between poultry from different In terms of percentage changes, the system sources while providing more detailed inforof 36 demand equations is given by: mation about the effects in the United States 6 and importing countries. Otherwise, the (6) dlnD = E dlnP model is theoretically identical to the first ik ikh ih model in which poultry was treated as a homogeneous good. The main additional rewhere Dik = percentage change in consumpquirements are more detailed, explicit specifition of poultry meat from councations of market shares and demand and suptry k in country i, ply elasticities in different regions. Pih = price of poultry meat from For this analysis, the world is decomposed country h in country i (country into six regions, including three major exi's currency), and porters: European Community (e), United ikh = elasticity of demand for poultry States (u), and Brazil (b); two major importers:
meat from country k with Japan (j) and Middle East (m); and the residual respect to the price of poultry rest-of-the-world or ROW (r). 3 meat from country h, in country Demand and Supply
The own-price elasticities of demand in counThe demand model follows the approach aptry i are defined by plied by Grennes, Johnson, and Thursby to analyze international trade in wheat, and by (7) nikk = -(l-Sik)ai + Sikqi Johnson (1984) to analyze flue-cured tobacco trade. In that model (based on Armington), and the cross-price elasticities are: consumers discriminate among products according to geographical origin. To analyze (8) Sikh = Sih(ai+ Hi) short-run responses, both Johnson (1984) and Grennes, Johnson, and Thursby took supply where oi = elasticity of substitution for as exogenous. In this study longer-run country i, responses are of more interest, and supply is fi = an overall demand elasticity treated as endogenous in a system of regional for poultry meat in country i, supply and demand functions. The supply and and demand models are expressed in terms of Sih = expenditure share of poultry percentage changes and elasticities. The meat from country h in country i.
Within any country (k), production of poultry
The system of equations formed by equameat depends on the price received by protions (6), (9), (10), and (11) can be written in ducers, the state of technology, the prices of matrix form as: factors of production, and the prices of alternative products which could be produced. In (12) AN = XNxN YN terms of percentage changes, the supply equations are defined as in equation (1) ply equations, 36 price linking To solve the model, the supply equations are equations, and 6 market clearing transformed to price dependent form. identities).
Market Clearing Conditions and Solution
The final solution is given by:
Demand prices and supply prices are linked (13) Y = -1A by:
which expresses the endogenous variables (Y) (10) dlnPik = Eik dlnpk + fik as a function of the parameters (X) and the policy shifters (A). An example of the strucwhere Pik = price of poultry meat from counp . try k in country i, ture of these matrices for the case of two coun-, ~~~~, .tries is given in Alston.
Pk = producers' price of poultry meat in country k, Parameter Estimates Eik = the elasticity of transmission of wholesale poultry price in country k to country i so that the first To construct the 'X matrix of parameters term on the right hand side is and shares requires a trade flow matrix, a the percentage change in Pik basic wholesale demand elasticity (i), an due to a change in pk and elasticity of substitution (ai), a supply elasticiik = percentage change in Pik in-ty (q), and six price transmission elasticities 1ik operce ntage chP e Pik it (Eik) for each of the six regions. As in Model 1, dependent Of Pk due, say, to a value of -0.5 is assumed for the basic detransport costs, exchange rates, mand elasticity in each of the six regions, and or tariffs.
the long-run supply elasticity in each region is Te me. cassumed initially to be 5. As with the previous The model is closed with the market clearing model, the use of this supply elasticity will identities. 6 place more of the burden of adjustment on (11) dlnQk -C bikdlnDik = 0 quantities produced and traded and less on i=l prices than if a smaller elasticity were used. where bik = the proportion of the poultry If this elasticity is too large, the effects of the meat produced in country k that is consumed policy change on the main variables of interest in country i, and the other variables are as will be overestimated. The trade flow matrix, previously defined.
based on 1981 data, is given in Table 3 . Time series of these data up to 1981 and a descripof the own-price elasticity of demand for tion of detailed sources and procedures to United States poultry in the Middle East compile the data are reported by Alston.
----------------------------------------
range from -2.8 to -33.7 for elasticities of For the initial simulations, all price transsubstitution from 3 to 36. mission elasticities are assumed to be 1.0.
Removing EC export subsidies would inLater, for sensitivity analysis, all cross-price crease the export/domestic price ratio for transmission elasticities are set to 0.5, leaving their poultry by an estimated 13 percent, as in own-price transmission elasticities (Eii) at 1.0. the homogeneous goods model. To measure It is difficult to have any sort of prior inforthe effects of removing the EC poultry export mation about the magnitude of the elasticity subsidies, the price wedge parameters (Oek) of substitution (ai) between "kinds" of poultry were set at 13 percent for EC exports to the meat in any market. Johnson (1971) suggests a Middle East, Japan, and the ROW (i.e., k = m, method for estimating the elasticities of j, and r). Assuming a variable levy rate equal substitution, but the only market that conto the export subsidy rate, removing the imsumes significant quantities of poultry meat port barriers would result in a 13 percent from a variety of sources is the Middle East reduction in the price of United States poultry market for which quality data in suitably long in the EC relative to the export price of time series are unavailable. Intuitively, the United States poultry. Removing the levies magnitude of the elasticity of substitution beon EC poultry imports is incorporated by settween commodities will vary among commoditing the price wedge parameters (Wke) at -13 ties depending on the level of aggregation of percent for EC imports of poultry from the commodities and countries.
United States, Brazil, and the ROW (k=u, b, From Johnson's (1971 Johnson's ( , 1984 work on wheat, and r). Finally, the supply shift parameter (ae) cotton, and tobacco, estimates are concenis set at -9 percent. This captures the effects trated around 3 for a range of commodities at of eliminating the effects of the CAP grains on a level of aggregation similar to that used the poultry sector as would result from either here. The simulations use a range of elasticieliminating the CAP grains altogether or comties of substitution, from 3 to 36, to test for pensating poultry producers for its effects sensitivity, with a feed grains subsidy. Each value of the elasticity of substitution implies a different matrix of demand elastiRes cities in each region. The matrices will differ between regions depending on shares which For all of the simulations, the consumption differ widely between regions. Elasticities of and trade shares were computed using the substitution cannot be evaluated intuitively, values in Table 3 , and the basic demand but the demand elasticities that they imply elasticities were set at -0.5 for all countries. can be evaluated. The range of elasticities of For the first set of simulations, the price substitution is chosen somewhat arbitrarily, transmission elasticities were all set at 1.0 and but it implies a very wide range of demand the supply elasticities were all set at 5. The elasticities. By way of illustration, estimates results are given in Table 4 . creasing the effects within, the EC but again d Note that the total change in world production and consumption is creasing the effects within, the EC but again 142,100 metric tons using either elasticity of substitution but the the changes are comparatively small. distribution of the total change varies.
Effects of a Retaliatory United States
The output from the model is percentage Export Subsidy changes in prices and quantities. Table 4 Export Subsidy shows the absolute changes in quantities
The effects of a retaliatory subsidy at a rate traded corresponding to these percentage of 10 percent on United States poultry exchanges. Using an elasticity of substitution of ports to all destinations were simulated using 3, the effects outside the EC are negligible the basic parameter values described above because the cross elasticities of demand, even and elasticities of substitution from 3 to 36. in the Middle East, are very small. EC exResults of those simulations using an elastiports would fall 54,000 metric tons (12 percity of substitution of 36 are reported in Table  cent) , and the EC imports would rise by 5. The effects were much smaller using an 11,000 metric tons (17 percent). Surprisingly, elasticity of substitution of 3. EC output of poultry meat would rise by EC output of poultry meat would rise by
The quantitative effects of the United States 92,000 metric tons (2.3 percent). This results
The quantitative effects of the Uted States because the increase in EC consumption of export subsidy on United Statesmarkets EC poultry meat (146,000 metric tons) is would be dramatic compared to eliminating EC poultry meat (146,000 metric tons) is the CAP. The estimates in Table 5 indicate greater than the reduction in EC exports.
the CAP. The estimates in Table 5 indicate When a larger elasticity of substitution is that there would bea 2.4 percent increase in used, there is greater displacement of EC price, a 1.2 percent decrease in consumption, a poultry meat, from both EC and export mar-12 percent increase in output, and more than a kets, by poultry meat from other countries.
trebling of exports which would increase from When a value of 36 is used for the elasticity of 355.6 thousand metric tons to 1,254 thousand substitution among "kinds" of poultry meat, metric tons. Exports by the EC, ROW, and EC production would fall if the CAP were Brazil to the Middle East would fall by 20 to eliminated. This is the more plausible result.
30 percent, and exports by these countries to Using an elasticity of substitution of 36 and Japan would fall by 40 to 50 percent. Howthe relatively large (in absolute value) demand ever, the overall effects in the European Comelasticities that this implies, the effects of munity would be fairly small. Output would changing the policy are still concentrated in fall by about 3 percent. States poultry industry are smaller than when considering the export subsidies alone. ticities, the effects of the policies were concenWith an export price of about $1.20 per trated in the EC. The "world price" was kilogram, a 10 percent subsidy would cost the slightly lower so that United States producers United States government about 12 cents per might have lost significant producer surplus, kilogram or $120 per metric ton. With total exbut this was almost entirely offset by conports of 1,254 thousand metric tons in the comitant gains to United States consumers. presence of the subsidy, the total subsidy There is some evidence that poultry is difwould cost the United States government ferentiated by place of origin in international $150 million per year. markets so that the homogeneous goods Some economists would consider a poultry model most likely overstates the effects of the meat supply elasticity of 5.0 as being too large EC policy in United States markets. for the United States. If a smaller supply elasticity had been used, the estimated effects of a
The differentiated goods equilibrium disretaliatory subsidy on quantities produced placement model allows a more disaggregaand traded would be smaller, and the effects tive analysis of the effects of trade policy in inwould be more concentrated in the United ternational poultry markets while accounting States. Thus, while a retaliatory subsidy is for quality differences associated with country unlikely to offer a significant penalty to the of origin. However, the model requires more European Community, it could involve signifidetaled specification of parameters which are cant budget costs to the United States. difficult to measure. Using a wide range of values for the elasticity of substitution be-CONCLUSIONS tween "kinds" of poultry meat, the effects of removing the CAP were concentrated in the Various analysts have suggested that the EC markets to which the policy applies di-EC export subsidies have had important efrectly. The effects were smaller, even in the fects on the United States poultry industry countries that deal directly in significant (e.g., Rowan, Mageira, National Broiler Counquantities with the EC, (mainly the Middle cil et al., and McClelland). That may be true, East) and the net effects in "third" countries but it would be inappropriate to evaluate the such as the United States were quite small. effects of the export subsidies in isolation
The magnitudes of effects outside the EC from the grains policies which the subsidies were small compared to the estimates assumare designed to offset. 4 The effects of elimiing poultry meat is homogeneous, regardless nating both the export subsidies and grains of source.
It is true that the EC policy has displaced duction and prices in the European CommuUnited States exports from the Middle East, nity and, therefore, would not be expected to but the impact has been quite modest, less be a significant sanction. As the CAP effects than 40,000 tons. This is in a market where are concentrated in the European Commutotal disappearance grew from 0.3 million tons nity, so would the effects of a retaliatory subin 1972 to 1.6 million tons in 1981, and total imsidy be concentrated in the United States ports were 0.75 million tons in 1981.
with potentially large government budget Finally, a retaliatory export subsidy by the costs. United States would have little effect on pro-
